On Correlation and Interrelation of Conceptual Apparatuses of the Criminal Cycle Sciences by Panov, M.
384 Yearbook of ukrainian law 
UDC 343.2.01: 164.2
M. Panov, Doctor of Law, Professor,  Head 
of the Department of Criminal Law No. 2, 
Yaroslav Mudriy National Law University, 
Member of the National Academy of Legal 
Sciences of Ukraine, Ukraine, Kharkiv
ON CORRELATION AND INTERRELATION  
OF CONCEPTUAL APPARATUSES  
OF THE CRIMINAL CYCLE SCIENCES
Abstract. The paper deals with the issues of correlation and interrelation of conceptual 
apparatuses of criminal cycle sciences: criminal, criminal procedural, criminal enforce-
ment law, criminology, forensic science, etc., based on methods of differentiation and inte-
gration of sciences. The method of differentiation enables us to divide the corresponding 
branches of knowledge into certain groups and to consider them as independent sciences; 
the method of integration illuminates the processes of convergence and interaction of sci-
ences, their interpenetration on the level of separate elements of conceptual apparatuses: 
legal categories, concepts of legal terminology. We distinguish a class of «interdisciplinary» 
categories of notions and terms, which are the subject of criminal law science and are used 
by all sciences of the criminal cycle. The rationale is given for the necessity of their inter-
pretation in all cases on the basis of the content and volume enshrined in them mainly by 
criminal law science. Other categories, concepts, and terms that are the subject of the ap-
plied sciences of the criminal cycle should be considered in all cases of their use, based on 
the interpretations provided by the relevant science that develops them.
Key words: conceptual apparatus of sciences of the criminal cycle, legal categories, 
legal concepts, legal terminology, differentiation of sciences, integration of sciences, in-
terdisciplinary categories, concepts, terms.
Subject topicality. The problem of 
conceptual apparatuses of sciences of a 
criminal cycle, especially their correla-
tion and interrelation, is underdeveloped. 
Meanwhile, the literature argues that the 
same legal categories, concepts, and 
terms that make up the content of the 
conceptual apparatus of most (or all) sci-
ences of the criminal cycle should be 
interpreted in a different way and each 
of these sciences can develop «own» 
categories, concepts and terminology. 
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This approach – albeit too controver-
sial – is significant both for legal science 
and for solving practical issues in law-
making and law enforcement. These cir-
cumstances led to the selection of the 
theme of correlation and interrelation of 
the conceptual apparatus of the criminal 
cycle sciences.
The aim of the article is to investi-
gate the correlation and interrelation of 
conceptual apparatuses of criminal cycle 
sciences on the level of legal categories, 
notions and legal terminology, to devel-
op and justify the rules of interpretation 
of the same («interdisciplinary») catego-
ries, concepts and terms used by different 
criminal cycle sciences and branches of 
legislation.
The criminal cycle (block) sciences 
in the literature include criminal law, 
criminal procedure law, criminal en-
forcement law, criminology, forensic sci-
ence, and others. (1, p. 77–79). These 
legal sciences are united mainly by the 
only generalized subject-pragmatic 
problem concerned – the problem of 
combating crime, founded on the inter-
sectoral fundamental scientific basis – 
«general theory of combating crime», 
which substantiates a specific and very 
important complex approach to the ac-
tivities of state and society in this ex-
tremely important area (2, pp. 170–223). 
However, each of these sciences has sig-
nificant differences from the others, 
which can be traced at different levels – 
at the level of research subjects, content, 
tasks, volume and limits of the sciences, 
their conceptual apparatus, etc. The basis 
of this approach is the method of differ-
entiation of sciences (from the lat. dif-
ferentia – division, dissection of the 
whole into qualitatively different parts), 
which is fundamental in science when 
dividing scientific knowledge into cer-
tain groups (types) and dividing certain 
types of sciences (3, p.241). The applica-
tion of this method gives grounds to state 
that scientific knowledge in the field of 
the criminal cycle (criminal law, criminal 
procedure law, criminology, forensic sci-
ence, etc.) is a group of independent, 
relatively isolated areas of knowledge, 
which, from the standpoint of their dis-
ciplinary organization, should be recog-
nized as independent sciences.
Notional apparatuses of these sci-
ences play a special role in the differen-
tiation of criminal cycle sciences. The 
term «conceptual apparatus of science» 
represents a collective concept, the struc-
ture of which includes its constituent 
elements: legal categories, concepts, and 
legal terminology, which constitute 
closely related and interacting legal log-
ical-linguistic entities, determined by the 
subject of the corresponding science (4, 
P. 205–222).
The development of a system of cat-
egories, concepts and legal terminology, 
the clarification of their interrelation and 
interaction and, at the same time, their 
relative isolation, the establishment of 
integrative links with the conceptual ap-
paratus of related branches of knowledge 
are the most important tasks and func-
tions of each of the legal sciences. The 
more perfect their conceptual appara-
tuses, the more developed are the catego-
ries, concepts, and corresponding termi-
nology, the more thoroughly clarified 
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the system of elements of conceptual 
apparatuses of other sciences, the more 
perfect is the scientific «toolkit» of the 
corresponding science and its disciplin-
ary organization, the more fully and ac-
curately reflects the essence of the phe-
nomena of objective reality, which al-
lows to master these phenomena more 
successfully and positively influence 
them (5, P. 3–8).
Accordingly, each of the sciences of 
the criminal cycle in its content has a 
system of categories, notions, and terms, 
which are objectively determined by the 
historically established subject of sci-
ence and belonging directly to this sci-
ence. Thus, in criminal law, these can 
include, for example, the categories of 
«crime», «elements of crime», «criminal 
liability», «guilt», «subject of crime», 
«punishment», some concepts of spe-
cific crimes provided for by the norms 
of the Special Part of the Criminal Code, 
etc.; in criminology – «crime», «causes 
of crime», «conditions contributing to 
the commission of a crime», «prevention 
of crime», «personality of a criminal», 
etc. In criminal proceedings: «state pros-
ecution,» «accused,» «pre-trial investi-
gation,» «victim,» «sentence,» «criminal 
proceedings,» «evidence,» etc.; in crim-
inal forensics: «forensic tactics,» «foren-
sic technology,» «forensic identifica-
tion,» «traceology,» «investigation tac-
tics,» «methods of investigation of cer-
tain types of crimes,» etc. These catego-
ries, concepts, and terms in the system 
of other logical-linguistic elements of the 
said sciences, in their unity and interac-
tion, form the conceptual apparatus of 
each of the sciences, which allows, in 
particular, to separate, differentiate and 
identify the corresponding branches of 
knowledge as independent sciences.
In addition to the differentiation of 
the sciences of the criminal cycle, their 
integration is also evident (from the lat. 
Integration – consolidation of separate 
parts into a whole), caused primarily by 
the fact that these sciences study separate 
aspects of one and the same common 
(generalized) object for them – crime and 
measures applied by the state and society 
in the struggle against it. The most com-
plete and prominent integration process-
es are manifested in the fact that all these 
sciences quite often operate with the 
same categories, notions, and terms, such 
as «crime», «constituent elements of a 
crime», «socially dangerous act», 
«guilt», «motive», «goal», «mode of 
committing a crime», «punishment», and 
notions of specific elements of crimes: 
«murder», «theft», «robbery», «plun-
der», «rape», etc. Moreover, all sciences 
of the criminal cycle include these cat-
egories, notions, and terms in the content 
of their conceptual apparatus and are 
used as logical and legal tools for solving 
the tasks each of them faces. Therefore, 
categories, notions, and terms of this 
kind acquire the significance of «inter-
disciplinary» or «intersectoral». They 
certainly qualitatively supplement the 
system of categories, notions, and terms 
of each of the sciences of the criminal 
cycle, make their conceptual apparatus-
es more complete, capacious, logically 
finalized. Taking into account the fact 
that the mentioned «interdisciplinary» 
notions are used by all the mentioned 
sciences, they can be referred to as the 
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category of «regional» notions (6, P. 27).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the majority of «interdisciplinary» cat-
egories, concepts and terms: «crime», 
«socially dangerous act», «corpus de-
licti», «guilt», «motive», etc. objective-
ly reflect various aspects of such social 
and legal phenomena of social and legal 
reality as crime, punishment or criminal 
liability, which are the subject of re-
search directly by the criminal law sci-
ence (7, P. 539–543). Therefore, these 
elements of the conceptual apparatus are, 
first of all, the subject of criminal law 
science, which should be primarily en-
gaged in their analysis and study of phe-
nomena and processes of real life re-
flected by these concepts. And this does 
not mean that other sciences of the crim-
inal cycle can not develop the said cat-
egories, concepts, and terms. The latter, 
as noted, in some cases, are also part of 
the conceptual apparatus of criminology, 
criminal procedure, forensics and other 
sciences of the criminal cycle and, con-
sequently, can be the subject of their 
study, because, with the unity of the sub-
ject of study, different sciences can es-
tablish different tasks and solve them 
with different, specific methods, tech-
niques and obtain different results.
But the extent and limits of the study 
and use of «interdisciplinary» categories, 
concepts and terminology by the said 
sciences, as well as the meaning of the 
conclusions of each of them for other 
related branches of knowledge, are quite 
uneven. This is explained by the fact that 
the mentioned sciences, being in close 
interrelation, at the same time are in dif-
ferent ways related to each other. The 
different relationships between these sci-
ences are the result, in particular, of the 
fact that some of them are fundamental 
sciences while others are applied sci-
ences. Jurisprudence is known to have a 
subdivision of sciences and branches of 
law on fundamental and applied scienc-
es (8, P. 20–21; 9, P. 28–33). Fundamen-
tal sciences reveal the essence and pat-
terns of development of the phenomena 
of the objective world and answer the 
question: «what is cognized?» And «how 
will it be discovered?» (8, P. 20–21; 9, 
P. 28–33). The applied sciences solve the 
problems of using the obtained scien-
tific knowledge about the objective real-
ity to solve specific practical problems 
and answer the question: «for what pur-
pose it is learned?» (10, P. 45–53). Fun-
damental legal sciences are always pri-
mary, they serve as a framework for a 
group of other sciences (family of sci-
ences), as they contain such a reference 
(constituent) logical and legal «materi-
al», which underlies the applied scienc-
es. For this reason, the sciences that 
study the problem of fighting crime 
should obviously also be divided into 
fundamental and applied sciences.
It follows from the above that the 
basis of all the sciences of the criminal 
cycle is the science of criminal law, the 
task, and subject of which is the cog-
nition of crime, punishment, criminal 
liability, criminal law as phenomena of 
social and legal reality, clarification of 
their essential features, legal forms of 
manifestation, development of measures 
concerning the correct application of the 
relevant legislation and its improvement, 
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extricably linked with criminal law, have 
the purpose to ensure the implementation 
of the basic provisions and regulations 
that are developed by this fundamental 
science. Thus, the link between crimi-
nal law and criminology is inseparable, 
which is of genetic nature, since crimi-
nology as an independent branch of legal 
science has emerged from the criminal 
law, it is based on the developed science 
of criminal law problems of crime, the 
composition of specific crimes, punish-
ment, measures to combat crime in gen-
eral. Hence, criminal law is certainly a 
basic (fundamental and starting) science 
for criminology (11, P. 70, 12, P. 58–67). 
At the same time, criminology, in its turn, 
enriches criminal law with a wide range 
of knowledge about crime, its causes, 
the effectiveness of various social and 
preventive measures in combating it, etc. 
(13, P. 14–61). So there is a mutual real 
influence of each of the sciences on the 
other (interaction of sciences).
Substantive criminal law, which is 
the subject of study of the science of 
criminal law, is the regulatory frame-
work for the emergence of criminal pro-
cedural relations. The latter, having their 
own meaning, serve as a legal form of 
establishing the existence of elements 
of a crime in the actions of a person 
found guilty of committing a socially 
dangerous act, as a mandatory condition 
of criminal liability and the imposition 
of an appropriate punishment, which is 
determined by the norms of criminal law. 
It follows that criminal procedural rela-
tions represent a form in which crimi-
nal legal relations are exercised (14, P. 
106–107). On this basis, the question of 
the relationship between the norms of 
criminal law and criminal procedure, 
which has long been considered in le-
gal science as a relationship of form and 
content in their dialectical unity, should 
also be solved: the same spirit should 
revive the judicial process and laws, 
because the process is only a form of 
law life, therefore, a manifestation of 
its inner being (15, P. 158). Therefore, 
substantive criminal law is the content 
of the corresponding criminal proce-
dural form. The law of criminal proce-
dure ensures the implementation of the 
norms of criminal law and therefore has 
an auxiliary, «proprietary» character in 
relation to the norms of substantive law 
(16, P. 84). It follows that the science of 
criminal procedure, the subject of which 
is the norms of criminal procedure law, 
while preserving the basic features of 
fundamentality, has an «auxiliary», «pro-
prietary» nature in relation to the science 
of criminal law, and therefore in this ratio 
of sciences performs the functions of 
applied science.
Forensics is also closely intercon-
nected with criminal law and process 
sciences. This relationship is also of a 
genetic nature, as forensic science origi-
nates primarily in the theory of criminal 
law and criminal process, where the 
formation of its foundations took place. 
The impact of substantive and proce-
dural law is therefore extremely strong 
in forensics. The norms of criminal law, 
as noted by A. A. Piontkovskyi, – are of 
decisive importance for understanding 
the content of objective truth in criminal 
proceedings and the range of circum-
stances that should be established in 
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each specific case (17, P. 11). The con-
cept of the elements of crime, which is 
central to the science of criminal law, is 
essential in the construction of methods 
of crime investigation. The attributes of 
specific elements ultimately determine 
the subject matter of an investigation 
in each case (18, P. 31). The relation-
ship between criminology and the sci-
ence of criminal proceedings is no less 
close. The data of procedural science, 
in particular, the general provisions of 
the theory of evidence, as indicated by 
G. M. Minkovskyi and A. R. Ratynov, 
are, of course, the starting points and 
determinants for the science that de-
velops detailed recommendations for 
the collection and investigation of evi-
dence (19, P. 147). Therefore, a number 
of provisions of forensics are based on 
the theory of the criminal process, for 
example, forensic tactics, recommen-
dations on the investigation planning, 
execution of investigative actions, etc. 
The solution of questions of forensic 
techniques and tactics is impossible 
without the application and indispens-
able observance of the norms of crimi-
nal procedure, just as the application 
of most norms of criminal procedure 
requires a wide and optimal use of fo-
rensic knowledge. The most important 
task of forensics is to ensure the correct 
and precise application of criminal law 
and process norms. In this regard, it 
seems reasonable to assert that foren-
sics is an applied science in relation to 
criminal law and criminal procedure 
and, consequently, in relation to crimi-
nal science and criminal procedure sci-
ence (20, P. 87–89; 21, P. 20–23).
Therefore, the science of criminal 
law, combining the features of funda-
mental and applied knowledge, is a fun-
damental science in relation to criminol-
ogy, criminal procedure, forensic sci-
ence, and other related sciences, as well 
as a theoretical and normative basis for 
all sciences of the criminal cycle. Con-
sequently, these sciences are not only in 
the relationship of coordination, but also 
in the relationship of subjugation, that 
is, subordination, and the determining 
value in their subordinate relationship is 
the science of criminal law. So, there are 
grounds to assert that in cases when other 
criminal law sciences of the criminal 
cycle use the provisions of the criminal 
law science, the latter, while develop-
ing matters arising from the subject of 
their study, and at the same time relate 
to the criminal law, and must proceed 
from the basic provisions of theoretical 
developments of the criminal law sci-
ence. With regard to the question under 
consideration, this means that these sci-
ences, using categories, concepts, and 
terminology developed by the criminal 
law science and belonging to the class 
of «interdisciplinary», use them gener-
ally as data. Thus, the categories (cardi-
nal concepts) «crime», «elements of a 
crime», «guilt», «complicity in a crime», 
«subject of a crime», «unfinished crime», 
etc., the wording of certain elements of 
crime in criminology, as indicated by 
M. I. Kovalyov, draws from the crimi-
nal legislation and criminal law theory 
and cannot interpret them arbitrarily (22, 
P. 58). The criminal-legal theory and the 
criminal law based on it, O. M. Dzhu-
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to crimes and criminals (to subjects of 
a crime – M. P.) that is obligatory for 
criminology (23, P. 361). In the opin-
ion of V. I. Kaminska, when a criminal-
legal notion is used in procedural law, it 
cannot be assigned a different meaning 
in comparison with criminal law (16, 
P. 98–99). Just as R. S. Bielkin wrote, 
forensic science does not develop issues 
of criminal law but takes ready-made 
solutions of this science (24, P. 38).
The stated above gives grounds to 
assert that interdisciplinary categories, 
concepts, and terminology developed by 
criminal law science and used by other 
related sciences are of a rather high lev-
el of abstraction. They have basic es-
sential features that define the essence of 
phenomena that are reflected in these 
concepts and therefore are not created, 
but are used («accumulated», «assimi-
lated») by criminology, criminal process, 
forensics as data (existing). Therefore, 
these sciences, such as those that are in 
a relationship of subordination with the 
criminal law science, when using catego-
ries, concepts and terms belonging to the 
class of interdisciplinary and are the sub-
ject of criminal law science, should be 
based on the content and scope that the 
criminal law science puts into them.
However, the proposed approach is 
not widely shared among scholars. Some 
of them believe that each of the sciences 
of the criminal cycle, operating with no-
tions that belong to the class of «inter-
disciplinary» and are the subject of 
criminal law science, can interpret them 
differently and put different meanings 
into them. For example, Yu. D. Bluvsh-
tein, N. A. Dobrynin, S. G. Kurganov 
argue that criminologists can put their 
own meaning into criminal law concepts 
(25, P. 45, 26, P. 61–62). D. A. Shestakov 
believes that crime science, not being 
limited to the criminal law definition of 
crime, feels the need to develop its own 
criminological concept, more in line with 
its essence. He suggested that in crimi-
nology, crime should be understood as 
acts which constitute a significant evil 
for a person and society, irrespective of 
the recognition of such act as a crime in 
legislation (27, P. 80). Close views of this 
position (that contravenes the law on 
criminal liability – M. P.) were also ex-
pressed by other criminologists (28, 
P. 113–119). In criminology, G. G. Zui-
kov and I. Sh. Zhordaniia believe that 
criminal law, forensic science, criminol-
ogy while studying the methods of crime, 
abstracting from its sides, which are in-
different to them, study different con-
cepts in terms of content (italics are 
mine – M. P.) by means of which the 
same object is investigated (29, P. 54, 30, 
P. 91). Similar deviations take place in 
law-making when, while elaborating and 
adopting a regulatory legal act in a cer-
tain area, notions or terms of other sec-
toral affiliation are borrowed and used 
which are, however, not yet sufficiently 
developed by science and practice or 
those which this science «does not neces-
sarily know» yet or which are only being 
discussed. In this respect, the shortcom-
ings of the decision of the Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine when adopting the 
Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine 
((Law No. 4651-VI of 13.04.2012) fur-
ther referred to as the CPC (entered into 
force on 20.11.2012)), which provides 
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for the features of pre-trial investigation 
(inquest) of criminal offenses (para. 7 
part 1 of Article 3, Article 215, Article 
298–302 of the CPC), draw attention. 
However, it is clear that at that time the 
criminal law category «criminal of-
fense» was not yet known to the criminal 
law of Ukraine (it was only discussed in 
the scientific community) and therefore 
definitely could not be used in the CPC 
to resolve both criminal procedural and 
criminal law issues for legislative regula-
tion of the inquest of a rather important 
area of the state’s activity in the fight 
against crime. Only on 22 November 
2018 the Law of Ukraine No. 2617-VIII 
«On Amendments to Certain Legislative 
Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Simpli-
fication of Pre-trial Investigation of Cer-
tain Categories of Criminal Offences» 
(which will come into force on 1 January 
2020) determined this criminal category 
by introducing amendments and addi-
tions to the Criminal Code (part 1, part 2 
of Article 12) and the CPC and thus the 
previously made error was corrected. 
Such negative practices in lawmaking 
are certainly extremely undesirable.
Analyzing the above-mentioned po-
sitions of scientists and lawmaking prac-
tice, it should be noted that the content 
of any concept, as it is known, forms a 
set of basic essential features of phenom-
ena (objects) that make up the volume of 
the concept. Therefore, if following the 
above-mentioned judgments and prac-
tices, it is necessary to admit that each 
of the mentioned sciences can recognize 
different, even not essential, features of 
the same phenomena (objects) as sig-
nificant. But such a solution is erroneous, 
because the essential signs forming the 
content of «interdisciplinary» notions 
reflecting the essence of the phenomena 
of real life, regardless of which of the 
sciences of the criminal cycle seeks to 
cognize it. Moreover, such an approach 
does not take into account the fundamen-
tal and determinant meaning of the crim-
inal law science (which is based on the 
regulatory framework of criminal legis-
lation) in relation to other sciences of the 
criminal cycle.
The stated above does not exclude 
the possibility of developing interdisci-
plinary categories, concepts, and termi-
nology related to the conceptual appara-
tus of criminal law science in criminol-
ogy, criminal procedure, and forensics. 
But the features that form the content of 
these categories, concepts, and terms in 
these related sciences should be derived 
from the main essential features of the 
conceptual apparatus of criminal law 
science. Therefore, these categories, no-
tions, and terms in these sciences (crim-
inology, forensic science, etc.) should be 
derived from the elements of the concep-
tual apparatus of criminal law. The pe-
culiarity of these elements is that they 
characterize the phenomena of objective 
reality, taking into account the tasks 
faced by the said sciences and arising 
from the subject of their study.
The criminal law science, having a 
personal relatively coherent and com-
plete system of categories, concepts and 
terminology, at the same time employs 
in a number of cases relevant elements 
of the conceptual apparatus of other ap-
plied sciences related to the criminal 
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ceptual apparatus. Thus, the Special 
Part of Criminal Law uses the concepts 
of «arrest», «detention», «custody», 
«sentence», «decision», «court sen-
tence», «witness», «interpreter» and 
other concepts related to the criminal 
process: «firearms», «edged weapons», 
etc., which are developed by forensic 
science. In many cases, forensics also 
relies on concepts that are developed by 
the science of the criminal process, as 
well as on theoretical provisions devel-
oped in criminology. Similarly, criminal 
procedure and criminology operate with 
the concepts and terms that are devel-
oped by forensic science. So, in all these 
cases there is an interpenetration of sci-
ences (strongly emphasized integra-
tion), which is observed at the level of 
individual elements of their conceptual 
apparatus. And the use of each of these 
sciences concepts and terms related to 
adjacent branches of knowledge should 
not seem to be arbitrary. It is known that 
scientific concepts are subjective in na-
ture of their formation, but objective in 
their origins, genesis, as a whole, are 
inextricably linked with the objective 
world and reflect it in generalized and 
essential features. Developing «own» 
concepts, each of the sciences of the 
criminal cycle clarifies the essence of 
the corresponding objective phenomena 
and anchors them in the concepts. Thus, 
the content of categories, notions, and 
terms of these sciences is ultimately 
determined by the objective world phe-
nomena included in the subject of their 
study. Therefore, if a criminal cycle sci-
ence includes in its conceptual appara-
tus the concepts and terms of related 
sciences that do not belong to the class 
of «interdisciplinary» notions, i.e., de-
veloped specifically not by the criminal 
law science, but by other sciences, then 
it should use them as data and proceed 
from the point of view that the relevant 
sciences invest in these concepts. A dif-
ferent solution would contradict the 
logic of scientific analysis, making it 
impossible to study the problems faced 
by each of the sciences of the criminal 
cycle, especially in areas where these 
sciences are closely linked to each oth-
er.
Conclusions. The provisions and 
suggestions on the correlation and inter-
relation of the conceptual apparatus of 
the criminal cycle sciences are of great 
importance both for the organization and 
conduct of scientific research in these 
sciences and for the solution of practical 
issues in the field of combating crime, in 
particular, in lawmaking and law en-
forcement activities. The defining dom-
inating factor in this activity and the 
main goal in this regard should be to 
achieve coherence and consistency of the 
conceptual apparatus of criminal cycle 
sciences – their categories, concepts, and 
legal terminology, especially in situa-
tions where a branch of knowledge (sci-
ence) uses certain elements of the con-
ceptual apparatus of another. In such 
cases, the interpretation of the relevant 
categories of concepts and terms belong-
ing to the class of «interdisciplinary» 
should be carried out on the above sci-
entific principles. Proceeding from this, 
we believe it is unacceptable to have dif-
ferent definitions and interpretations of 
the same categories, concepts and legal 
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terms used in adjacent (related) but still 
different sciences of the criminal cycle, 
belonging to the class of «interdisciplin-
ary». Their definition, in this case, is 
determined by their interpretation in 
criminal law. This is especially important 
in the sciences, the subjects of which 
include (as their legal framework) the 
relevant branches of legislation: crimi-
nal, criminal procedure, criminal en-
forcement. These legislative systems 
should be clearly coordinated while their 
conceptual apparatuses are logically co-
ordinated, contradictions and different 
interpretations of the same categories, 
concepts and terms in these different (but 
related) areas of legislation are unaccept-
able.
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